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Issues and Findings
Discussed in this Brief: Research exploring police officers' understanding of
agency rules concerning police misconduct and the extent of their support for
these rules. The survey also considered
officers' opinions about appropriate
punishment for misconduct, their familiarity with the expected disciplinary
threat, their perceptions of disciplinary
fairness, and their willingness to report
misconduct. The results of this survey
have important implications for researchers and policymakers, as well as
for police practitioners.
Key issues: Until recently, most studies of police corruption were based
on a traditional administrative approach-one that views the problem
of corruption primarily as a reflection
of the moral defects of individual police officers. This research, however, is
based on the organizational theory of
police corruption, which emphasizes
the importance of organizational and
occupational culture.
Researchers asked officers in 30 U.S.
police agencies for their opinions about
various hypothetical cases of police misconduct, thereby avoiding the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt
behavior would likely provoke. The survey measured how seriously officers regarded police corruption, how willing
they were to report it, and how willing
they were to support punishment. By
analyzing officers' responses to the survey questions, researchers were able to
oolice agencies according to
ronments of integrity. Thecameasure integrity in this way is
significant for police adminisho, this research suggests,
)le to influence and cultivate
continued...
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The Measurement of Police Integrity
By Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak /vkovich, William E. Harver, and Maria R. Haberfeld

As the history of virtually every police
agency attests, policing is an occupation
that is rife with opportunities for misconduct. Policing is a highly discretionary,
coercive activity that routinely takes
place in private settings, out of the sight
of supervisors, and in the presence of wit·
nesses who are often regarded as unreliable. Corruption-the abuse of police
authority for gain-is one type of mis·
conduct that has been particularly problematic. The difficulties of controlling
corruption can be traced to several factors: the reluctance of police officers to
report corrupt activities by their fellow
officers (also known as "The Code," "The
Code of Silence," or "The Blue Curtain"),
the reluctance of police administrators to
acknowledge the existence of corruption
in their agencies, the benefits of the typical corrupt transaction to the parties involved, and the lack of immediate victims
willing to report corruption.
Until recently, police administrators
viewed corruption primarily as a reflection of the moral defects of individual
police officers. They fought corruption
by carefully screening applicants for police positions and aggressively pursuing
morally defective officers in an attempt
to remove them from their positions before their corrupt behavior had spread
through the agency. This administrative/

individual approach, sometimes called
the "bad apple" theory of police corruption, has been subject to severe criticism
in recent years.
This Research in Brief summarizes a
study that measured police integrity in 30
police agencies across the United States.
The study was based on an organizational/occupational approach to police
corruption. Researchers asked officers
for their opinions about 11 hypothetical
cases of police misconduct and measured
how seriously officers regarded police
corruption, how willing they were to support its punishment, and how willing they
were to report it. The survey found substantial differences in the environments
of integrity among the agencies studied.
The more serious the officers considered
a behavior to be, the more likely they
were to believe that more severe discipline was appropriate, and the more willing they were to report a colleague for
engaging in that behavior.

Contemporary approaches
to corruption
Pioneered by Herman Goldstein, 1 contemporary theories of police corruption
are based on four organizational and
occupational dimensions. Each is
described below.
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Issues and Findings
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environments of integrity within their
agencies.
Key findings: Based on officers'
responses to questions relating to 11
hypothetical case scenarios involving
police officers engaged in a range of
corrupt behavior, the following conclusions emerged:

• In assessing the 11 cases of police misconduct, officers considered
some types to be significantly less
serious than others.
• The more serious the officers
perceived a behavior to be, the
more likely they were to think that
more severe discipline was appropriate, and the more willing they
were to report a colleague who
had engaged in such behavior.
• Police officers' evaluations of the
appr~riate and expected discipline
for various types of misconduct were
very similar; the majority of police
officers regarded the expected discipline as fair.
• A majority of police officers said
that they would not report a fellow
officer who had engaged in what
they regarded as less serious misconduct (for example, operating an
off-duty security business; accepting
free gifts, meals, and discounts; or
having a minor accident while driving under the influence of alcohol.
• At the same time, most police
officers indicated that they would
report a colleague who stole from
a found wallet or a burglary scene,
accepted a bribe or kickback, or
used excessive force on a car thief
after a foot pursuit.
• The survey found substantial differences in the environment of integrity
among the 30 agencies in the sample.
Target audience: Criminal justice
researchers and policymakers, legislators, police administrators, police
officers, and educators.

f')

i) 0 l

I ·-· 8

sion concerns how the orgamzauonal
rules that govern corruption are established, communicated, and understood. In
the United States, where police agencies
are highly decentralized, police organizations differ markedly in the types of activities they officially prohibit as corrupt
behavior. This is particularly true of marginally corrupt or mala prohibita behavior, such as off-duty employment and
acceptance of favors, small gifts, free
meals, and discounts. Further complicating the problem, the official policy of
many agencies formally prohibits such
activities while their unofficial policy,
supported firmly but silently by supervisors and administrators, is to permit and
ignore such behavior so long as it is limited in scope and conducted discreetly.
Prevention and control mechanisms.
The second dimension of corruption emphasized in contemporary approaches is
the wide range of mechanisms that police
agencies employ to prevent and control
corruption. Examples include education
in ethics, proactive and reactive investigation of corruption, integrity testing, and
corruption deterrence through the discipline of offenders. The extent to which
agencies use such organizational anticorruption techniques varies greatly.
The Code. The third dimension of corruption, inherent in the occupational culture of policing, is The Code or The Blue
Curtain that informally prohibits or discourages police officers from reporting the
misconduct of their colleagues. The parameters of The Code-precisely what behavior it covers and to whom its benefits
are extended-vary among police agencies. For example, The Code may apply to
only low-level corruption in some agencies and to the most serious corruption in
others. Furthermore, whom and what The
Code covers can vary substantially not
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mly among police agencies but also
within police agencies. Particularly in
large police agencies, the occupational
culture of integrity may differ substantially among precincts, service areas,
task forces, and work groups.
Public expectations. The fourth dimension of police corruption that contemporary
police theory emphasizes is the influence
of the social, economic, and political environments in which police institutions, systems, and agencies operate. For example,
some jurisdictions in the United States
have long, virtually uninterrupted traditions of police corruption. Other jurisdictions have equally long traditions of
minimal corruption, while still others have
experienced repeated cycles of scandal
and reform. Such histories indicate that
public expectations about police integrity
exert vastly different pressures on police
agencies in different jurisdictions. These
experiences also suggest that public pressures to confront and combat corruption
may be successfully resisted.

Methodological challenges to
the study of police corruption
Although many theories can be applied to
the study of police corruption, the contemporary organizational/occupational culture
theory has an important advantage over the
traditional administrative/individual badapple theory: The organizational/occupational approach is much more amenable
to systematic, quantitative research.
Corruption is extremely difficult to study
in a direct, quantitative, and empirical
manner. Because most incidents of corruption are never reported or recorded,
official data on corruption are best regarded as measures of a police agency's
anticorruption activity, not the actual
level of corruption. Even with assurances
of confidentiality, police officers are un-
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likely to be willing to report their own
or another officer's corrupt activities.
Unlike the administrative/individual
approach, an organizational/occupational culture approach to the study of
police integrity involves questions of
fact and opinion that can be explored
directly, without arousing the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt behavior are likely to provoke.
Using this approach, it is possible to
ask nonthreatening questions about
officers' knowledge of agency rules and
their opinions about the seriousness of
particular violations, the punishment
that such violations would warrant or
actually receive, and their estimates of
how willing officers would be to report
such misconduct.
Moreover, sharply different goals and
visions of police integrity characterize
these two approaches to understanding
corruption. The administrative/individual theory of corruption envisions
the police agency of integrity as one
from which all morally defective individual officers have been removed and
in which vigilance is maintained to prevent their entry or emergence. By contrast, the organizational/occupational
culture theory envisions the police
agency of integrity as one whose culture
is highly intolerant of corruption.
Methodologically, the consequences of
these two visions are critical. For example, although it may be possible to
use an administrative/individual ap~
proach to measure the level of corrupt
behavior, the number of morally defective police officers, and an agency's
vigilance in discovering misconduct,
the obstacles to doing so are enormous.
Using an organizational/occupational
culture approach, by contrast, modem
social science can easily measure how
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seriously officers regard misconduct,
how amenable they are to supporting
punishment, and how willing they are
to tolerate misconduct in silence.
In an effort to measure the occupational
culture of police integrity, a systematic,
standardized, and quantitative survey
questionnaire was designed and pretested. The survey sought information
in key areas that constitute the foundation of an occupational/organizational
culture theory of police integrity. At the
same time, the survey responses could
be used to satisfy certain basic informational needs of practical police administration. The survey attempted to
answer the following questions:
• Do officers in this agency know the
rules governing police misconduct?
• How strongly do they support those
rules?
• Do officers know what disciplinary
threat they face if they violate those
rules?
• Do they think the discipline is fair?
• How willing are they to report
misconduct?
For a more detailed description of the
survey methodology and samples, see
Survey Design and Methodology. The
actions taken to enhance the legitimacy
of the survey results are discussed in
Validity of Survey Responses.

Survey results
The results of the survey, reported in
exhibit 1, show that the more serious
a particular behavior was considered
by police officers, the more severely
they thought it should and would be
punished, and the more willing they
were to report it. The extraordinarily

•

responses to the survey questions
suggests that all six integrity-related
questions measured the same phenomenon-the degree of police intolerance for corrupt behavior.
Offense seriousness. The 11 case
scenarios fall into 3 categories of perceived seriousness. Four cases were
not considered very serious by police
respondents: Case 1, off-duty operation of a security system business;
Case 2, receipt of free meals; Case 4,
receipt of holiday gifts; and Case 8,
coverup of a police accident that involved driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI). The majority of police
respondents, in fact, reported that the
operation of an off-duty security system business (Case 1) was not a violation of agency policy. Respondents
considered four other cases of misconduct to be at an intermediate level;of
seriousness: Case 10, the use of excessive force on a car thief following'a,
foot pursuit; Cas~ 7, a supervisor who
offers a subordinate.time off during
holidays in exchange for tuning up his
personal car; Case 9, acceptance of
free drinks in exchange for ignoring
a late bar closing; and Case 6, receip~
of a kickback. Respondents regarded
the remaining three cases-those that
involved stealing from a found wallet
(Case 11), accepting a money bribe
(Case 3), and stealing a watch at a
crime scene (Case 5)-as very serious
offenses.
Discipline. In general, police officers
thought that the four cases they regarded as not very serious warranted
little or no discipline. Officers thought
that the four cases involving an intermediate level of seriousness merited a
written reprimand or a period of suspension, and that the three very seri-

high rank-order 009\Je,n~~~WJO~E FRoOMases merited dismissal.
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Survey Design and Methodology
ase scenarios. The survey questionnaire presented officers with 11 hypothetical case scenarios. Displayed in
exhibit A, the scenarios cover a range of
activities, from those that merely give an
appearance of conflict of interest (Case 1)
to incidents of bribery (Case 3) and theft
(Cases 5 and 11 ). One scenario (Case 1O)
described the use of excessive force on a
car thief.
Respondents were asked to evaluate each
scenario by answering seven questions

(see exhibit B). Six of these questions were designed to assess the normative inclination of
police to resist temptations to abuse the
rights and privileges of their occupation. To
measure this dimension of police integrity, the
six questions were paired as follows:
• Two questions pertained to the seriousness of each case---Dne addressed the
respondent's own view and the other
concerned the respondent's perception
of the views of other officers.

Exhibit A. Case scenarios
Case 1.

A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security
devices, such as alarms, special locks. etc He does this work during his off-duty hours.

Case 2.

A police officer routinely accepts free meals. cigarettes, and other items of small value
from merchants on his beat He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse
the generosity of those who give gifts to him .

Case 3.

A police officer stops a motorist for speeding . The officer agrees to accept a personal
gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.

Case 4.

A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and
restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts
of food and liquor.

Case 5.

A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop The display cases are smashed,
and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes
a watch, worth about 2 days' pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been
stolen during the burglary.

Case 6.

A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the
owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral,
he receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner.

Case 7.

A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work
during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to
tune up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the supervisor's behavior.

Case 8.

At 2:00a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted
road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He
approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident
and offense, he transports the driver to his home

Case 9.

A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its
legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to
accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

Case 10.

Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an
automobile. The man flees . They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending
him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both
officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and
resisting.

Case 11.

A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot, It contains an amount of money
equivalent to a full day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property
but keeps the money for himself.
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• Two related to severity of disciplineone addressed the discipline the respondent felt the behavior should receive
and the other addressed the discipline
the officer felt it would receive.
• Two concerned willingness to report
the misconduct-one addressed the
respondent's own willingness to
report it, and the other concerned
the respondent's perception of other
officers' willingness to report it.
The remaining question asked respondents whether the behavior described
in the scenario was a violation of the
agency's official policy.
The incidents described in the scenarios
were not only plausible and common
forms of police misconduct, but ones that
were uncomplicated by details that might
introduce ambiguity into either the interpretation of the behavior or the motive
of the officer depicted in the scenario.
Some scenarios were based on published
studies that had employed a case scenario
approach.• Others drew on the experience
of the authors. Respondents were asked
to assume that the officer depicted in each
scenario had been a police officer for 5
years and had a satisfactory work record
with no history of disciplinary problems.
Survey sample. The sample consisted of
3,235 officers from 30 U.S. police agencies. Although these agencies were drawn
from across the Nation and the sample
was quite large, it was nonetheless a convenience sample, not a representative
sample. The characteristics of the officers
in this sample are summarized in exhibit C.
The majority of the police officers surveyed
were employed in patrol or traffic units
(63.1 percent). The overwhelming majority
of respondents were line officers; only
one of five police officers was a supervisor.
The mean length of service for the entire
sample was 10.3 years.
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The sample has some biases, including
overrepresentation of particular types of
police agencies and particular regions of
the country. Because it includes no State
police agencies, only one sheriff's agency,
and only one county police agency, the
sample overrepresents municipal police
agencies. The sample also overrepresents
police agencies from the Northeast. Although the sample does include agencies
from the South, Southeast, and Southwest,
it does not include agencies from the West,
Northwest, or Midwest.
The sample likely has another bias because
not all agencies that were asked to participate in the study accepted the invitation.
The reason for an agency's refusal to participate could include a fear of revealing
something untoward. Agencies declined
to participate despite assurances that their
participation in the suNey would be kept
confidential; that all individual respondents
would remain anonymous; and that respondents would be asked about only
their opinions, not any actual misconduct.
Nevertheless, the sample includes some
seriously troubled police agencies. Key
contacts in a number of such agencies,
including senior officers and high-ranking
union officials, exercised sufficient influence to arrange the participation of these
agencies in the suNey.
a. A number of studies of police corruption
have employed a research strategy that asked
police officers to evaluate hypothetical corruption scenarios. These include Fishman, Janet
E., Measuring Police Corruption, New York:
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1978;
Martin, Christine, Illinois Municipal Officers'
Perceptions of Police Ethics, Chicago: Illinois
Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1994;
Huon, Gail F., Beryl L. Hesketh, Mark G. Frank,
Kevin M. McConkey, and G.M. McGrath, Perceptions of Ethical Dilemmas, Payneham, Australia: National Police Research Unit, 1995;
and Miller, Larry S., and Michael C. Braswell,
" Police Perceptions of Ethical DecisionMaking: The Ideal vs. The Real, " American
Journal of Police 27 (1992): 27-45.
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Exhibit B. Case scenario assessment options
1. How serious do YOU cons ider this behavior to be?
Not at all serious
Very serious
1
2
3
4
5
2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?
Not at all serious
Very serious
1
2
3
5
4
3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?
Definitely not
Definitely yes
1
2
3
4
5
4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if
any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow?
1. NONE
4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND
5. DEMOTION IN RANK
3. WRITIEN REPRIMAND
6. DISMISSAL
5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if
any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow?
1. NONE
4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND
5. DEMOTION IN RANK
3. WRITIEN REPRIMAND
6. DISMISSAL
6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?
Definitely not
Definitely yes
1
2
3
4
5
7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow
pol ice officer who engaged in th is behavior?
Definitely not
Definitely yes
1
2
3
5
4

Exhibit C. Characteristics of the police agency sample
Agency Size
(number of
sworn officers)

Sample
Size

Very Large (500+)

59.9

1,937

14.8

64.2

9.18

Large (201-500)

19.7

638

23.2

60.3

12.05

Medium (76-200)

9.0

292

29 .9

59.0

12.29

Small (25-75)

8.5

275

30.8

66.1

11.70

Very Small (<25)

2.9

93

35 .9

64.8

11.29

100.0

3,235

19.8

63.1

10.30

Total/Average

5
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Percentage
Supervisory
Patrol!
Percentage
Traffic

Mean
Length of
Service
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Validity of Survey Responses
he validity of the survey's results
hinges on the honesty of police officers
when responding to the survey questions.
Several steps were taken to enhance the
legitimacy of the survey results. First, officers were asked only about their attitudes,
not about their actual behavior or the actual behavior of other police officers. They
also were assured that their responses
would remain confidential, although police respondents are naturally suspicious of
such promises.
To further allay officers' fears that their
identities might be discovered, they were
asked only minimal background questions:
their rank, length of service, and assignment and whether they held a supervisory
position. They were not asked standard
questions about age, race, gender, or
ethnicity in an effort to assuage fears that
disclosing such information, in combination
with their rank, assignment, and length of

To measure how officers perceived
the fairness of discipline, the scores
on the "discipline would receive"
scale were subtracted from the scores
on the "discipline should receive"
scale. A difference of zero was interpreted to mean that the respondent
thought the discipline was fair. If the
difference was greater than zero
(positive), the respondent thought that
the discipline was too lenient. Conversely, if the difference was less
than zero (negative), the respondent
thought that the discipline was too
harsh. 2 In 7 of the l l cases, the overwhelming majority of police officers
in the sample thought that the discipline that would be imposed was in
the "fair" range. But in the remaining

service, would make it possible to identify
them.
In addition, at the end of the survey,
each police respondent was asked two
questions about the validity of the responses. The first was "Do you think
most police officers would give their
honest opinion in filling out this questionnaire?" The second was "Did you?"
In answer to the first question, 84.4 percent of police respondents reported that
they thought most officers would answer the questions honestly, and 97.8
percent reported that they themselves
had done so. The responses of the 2.2
percent of police officers who reported
that they had not answered the questions honestly were discarded when the
survey results were analyzed.
The survey questions also were designed
to minimize any temptation for officers to
manipulate responses to create a favorable impression on the public or on their

four cases, including three that officers considered not serious-Case 2
(accepting free meals and discounts
on the beat), Case 4 (accepting holiday gifts), Case 8 (coverup of police
DUI), and Case 10 (excessive force on
car thief)-more than 20 percent of
police officers believed that the discipline administered by their agencies
would be too harsh.
Parameters of The Code. An examination of the parameters of The Code of
Silence, as revealed in the responses of
police officers in the sample, indicated
that the majority would not report a police colleague who had engaged in behavior described in the four scenarios
considered the least serious. At the
same time, a majority indicated that

~
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supervisors. Some officers, for example,
might have been inclined to report that
certain types of misconduct were more
serious than they actually thought them
to be. At the same time, however, these
officers would be unlikely to report that
misconduct should be punished more
severely than they thought appropriate
because of the possibility that they might
one day be subject to such discipline, if
administrators believed that they were
recommending it.
Furthermore, if any substantial manipulation of answers had occurred, it would
have been evident in differences in correlation coefficients among the questions
about seriousness, discipline, and willingness to report. In fact, the rank order
correlation between all six questions is
extraordinarily high. Indeed, one could
predict with great accuracy the ranking of
a scenario on any one of the six questions
by knowing the ranking for any other.

they would report3 a fellow police officer who had engaged in behavior they
deemed to be at an intermediate or high
level of seriousness.

Agency contrasts in the
culture of integrity
Measurements of the inclination of U.S.
police to resist temptations to abuse the
rights and privileges of their occupation
are likely to prove useful for academic,
historical, and cross-cultural studies of
police. 4 For police administrators, however, measurements of the culture of integrity of individual police agencies are
more relevant than national averages,
which often mask significant differences among agenc1es.
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Exhibit 1. Police officers' perceptions of offense seriousness, appropriate and expected discipline, and willingness to
report, ranked by officers' perceptions of case seriousness*
Discipline

Seriousness
Case Scenario
Case 1. Off-Duty
Security System
Business
Case 2. Free Meals,
Discounts on Beat
Case 4. Holiday Gifts
From Merchants
Case 8. Coverup of
Police DUI Accident
Case 10. Excessive
Force on Car Thief
Case 7. Supervisor:
Holiday for Tuneup
Case 6. Auto Repair
Shop 5% Kickback
Case 9. Drinks to
Ignore Late Bar Closing
Case 11. Theft From
Found Wallet
Case 3. Bribe From
Speeding Motorist
Case 5. Crime Scene
Theft of Watch

Own View
Score Rank

1.46
2.60
2.84
3.03
4.05
4.18
4.50

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Other Officers
Score
Rank

1.48
2.31
2.64
2.86
3.70
3.96
4.26

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Should Receive
Score Rank
Mode

1.34

2.53
2.81

1.46

1

2

1.94

2

1.82

2

3

Written
reprimand

2.36

4

2.28

3.5

4

Suspend
without pay

2.34

3

2.28

3.5

6

Suspend
without pay

3.39

5

3.07

5

5

Written
reprimand

3.45

6

3.29

6

3.95

8

3.71

8

3.73

7

3.47

7

4.08

7

5

4.40

1

8

6

3.59

1.37

4.46

4

3.76

None

8

3

2.37
2.82
3.21
4.00
3.43

Other Officers
Score Rank

Verbal
reprimand

Suspend
without pay
Suspend
without pay

2

1.51

Own View
Score Rank

1

None
Verbal
reprimand
Verbal
reprimand
Suspend
without pay
Suspend
without pay
Written
reprimand
Suspend
without pay

1

2.13

Willingness to Report

Would Receive
Score Rank
Mode

4.54

8

4.28

8

4.02

7

Suspend
without pay

4.85

9

4.69

9

5.09

10

Dismissal

5.03

10

Dismissal

4.23

10

3.96

10

4.92

10

4.81

10

4.92

9

Dismissal

4.86

9

Dismissal

4.19

9

3.92

9

4.95

11

4.88

11

5.66

11

Dismissal

5.57

11

Dismissal

4.54

11

4.34

11

* Scores are based on officers' responses to the integrity-related survey questions.

To uncover these differences and allow
comparisons to be made, a system was
devised for ranking the responses of
officers in each agency. To determine
an agency's overall ranking on how its
officers perceived the seriousness of a
particular offense, the mean score of all
responses by officers in that agency to
each of the 11 case scenarios was compared to the mean scores of the remaining 29 agencies. The agency was then
awarded 3 points if its mean score
placed it among the top lO agencies on
any question, 2 points if it scored in
the middle 10, and 1 point if it scored
among the lowest 10. These scores were
then totaled for all 11 case scenarios.
Using this scaling system, an agency's
score on its officers' perceptions of the
seriousness of the offenses could range
from 11 (if it ranked in the lowest third

of agencies on all11 cases) to 33 (if it
ranked among the highest third of agencies on all11 cases). 5
These summary scores formed the basis for placing agencies in rank order
from 1 to 30 (with 1 being the highest
integrity rating), making it possible to
say that an agency ranked "n out of
30" in its officers' perceptions of offense seriousness. This procedure was
used to calculate a summary score and
an integrity ranking for each agency's
responses to each of the six questions
about offense seriousness, discipline
that should and would be received,
and willingness to report the offense.
Exhibit 2 summarizes those rankings.
The enviromnent of integrity in
two agencies. To illustrate how envi-
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ronments of integrity differ across U.S.
police agencies, it is useful to contrast
the responses of officers from two of
the agencies in the sample. Agency 2,
which ranked 8th in integrity of the
30 agencies surveyed, and Agency 23,
which ranked in a 5-way tie for 24th
place, are both large municipal police
agencies. Agency 2 has a national reputation for integrity, is extremely receptive to research, and is often promoted
as a model of innovation. Agency 23
has a long history of scandal, and its
reputation as an agency with corruption
problems persists despite numerous reform efforts. Although a local newspaper once dubbed Agency 23 "the most
corrupt police department in the country," six other agencies in the sample
appear to have integrity environments
that are as poor or worse.

•
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In both agencies, the correlation of the
scores' rank ordering among the categories was very high, as it was for all 30
agencies surveyed. For every agency,
the mean rank order of officers' responses to the six integrity-related
questions was nearly identical. Furthermore, the rank ordering of the scenarios
differed little among the agencies.
Although differences in the rank ordering of the scenarios were minimal,
both within and between the two agencies, discrepancies in the agencies'
absolute scores reflected significant
differences (see exhibits 3 and 4).
Estimates of offense seriousness were
consistently higher for Agency 2 than
for Agency 23. The differences were
especially large (between 0.5 and 1.0
on a 5-point scale) for three scenarios:
Case 6 (auto repair shop kickback),
Case 9 (drinks to ignore late bar closing), and Case 10 (excessive force on
car thief). Police officers from Agency
2 evaluated each of these cases as
substantially more serious than did
officers from Agency 23.
The mean scores for discipline indicate
that, in almost every case, police officers in Agency 2 not only expected
more severe discipline than did officers
in Agency 23, but they also thought
that more severe discipline was appropriate. The differences in perceptions
of discipline were especially great for
the most serious types of corruption,
such as the scenarios described in
Case 3 (bribe from speeding motorist),
Case 5 (crime scene theft of watch),
and Case 11 (theft from found wallet),
as well as for Case 10 (use of excessive
force). While officers in Agency 2
thought that dismissal would result
from the four most serious cases, officers in Agency 23 expected that dismissal would follow only one scenario,
Case 5 (theft from a crime scene).
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Exhibit 2. Composite scores on seriousness of offense, discipline, and
willingness to report, rank-ordered by agency

Agency
Number

1
3
4
6
10
17
30
2
18
7
11
12
5
19
20
29
26
27
24
21
22
9
16
13
14
15
23
25
8
28

Other
Own
Officers'
Discipline
Opinion of Opinions of
Should
Seriousness Seriousness Receive

3
3
3
3

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

The most systematic and dramatic difference between Agencies 2 and 23,
however, is evident in their attitudes
toward The Code of Silence. In both
agencies, few officers said that they or
their police colleagues would report
any of the least serious types of corrupt behavior (Cases 1, 2, 4, and 8).
Officers from Agency 2 reported that

I ••
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Discipline

Would
Receive

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2

2
1
3
2
2
1
2
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1

Own
Willingness
to Report

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1

Other
Officers'
Willingness
to Report

Summary
Score/
Integrity
Ranking

3

18/1

3

18/1

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

18/1
18/1
18/1
18/1
18/1
17/8
16/9
15/10
14/11
14/11
13/13
13113
13/13
12/16
11/17
11/17
10/19
9/20
9/20
8/22
8/22
7/24
7/24
7/24
7/24
7/24
6/29
6/29

they and their colleagues would report
the behavior described in the seven
other cases. In Agency 23, however,
there was no case that the majority of
officers indicated they would report. In
sum, while The Code is under control
in Agency 2, it remains a powerful influence in Agency 23, providing an
environment in which corrupt behavior
can flourish.
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Exhibit 3. Agency 2 vs. Agency 23: Officers' own perceptions of seriousness of misconduct, discipline warranted, and
willingness to report offense
Agency 2 (A2) vs.
Agency 23 (A23)
Perception of Seriousness
Case Scenario

Agency 2 (A2) vs.
Agency 23 (A23)
Discipline Should Receive

A2

A23

Difference

Case 1. Off-Duty Security
System Business

1.57

1.36

0.21

Case 2. Free Meals,
Discounts on Beat

3.04

2.85

0.19

-2.82
p<.05
-1.80
p<.01

5.02

ttest

Agency 2 (A2) vs.
Agency 23 (A23)
Will ingness To Report

A2

A23

Difference

ttest

A2

A23

Difference

1.47

1.24

0.23

-3.60
p<.001

1.57

1.22

0.35

2.50

2.31

0.19

-2.48
p<.01

2.42

1.75

0.67

-4.78
p<.001
-6.67
p<.001

4.44

0.58

-6.28
p<.001

4.67

3.02

1.65

-16.09
p<.001

-1.35
NS*

2.74

2.05

0.69

4.92

3.36

1.56

-6.24
p<.001
-15.97
p<.001

4.38

2.71

1.67

-15.63
p<.001

t test

Case 3. Bribe From
Speeding Motorist

4.94

4.78

0.16

-3 .72
p<.001

Case 4. Holiday Gifts
From Merchants

3.07

2.79

0.28

-2.47
p<.01

2.73

2.59

0.14

Case 5. Crime Scene
Theft of Watch

4 .97

4.79

0.18

-4.21
p<.001

5.85

4.90

0.95

Case 6. Auto Repair
Shop 5% Kickback

4 .58

4.02

0.56

-6 .74
p< .001

4.41

3.74

0.67

-12.64
p<.001
-6.47
p<.001

Case 7. Supervisor:
Holiday for Tune up

4.16

4.05

0.11

-1.24
NS*

3.58

3.51

0.07

-0.72
NS*

3.68

2.66

1.02

Case 8. Coverup of
Police DUI Accident

3.16

2.68

0.48

-4.32
p<.001

2.85

2.57

0.28

-2.69
p<.05

2.67

2.03

0.64

4.10

3.17

0.93

-10.45
p<.001

4.21

2.48

1.73

-8.68
p<.001
-5.66
p<.001
-16.02
p<.001

Case 9. Drinks to Ignore
Late Bar Closing

4.68

3.77

0.91

-9.96
p<.001

Case 10. Excessive
Force on Car Thief

4.45

3.49

0.96

-10.12
p< .001

3.97

3.15

0.82

-8.30
p<.001

4.02

2.53

1.49

-13.42
p<.001

Case 11. Theft From
Found Wallet

4.94

4.55

0.39

-6.85
p<.001

5.42

4.13

1.29

-14.17
p<.001

4.74

2.95

1.79

-17.41
p<.001

* Not significant.

Conclusions and implications
Redefining the problem of police corruption (i.e., the abuse of police authority for gain) as a problem of police
integrity-the normative inclination
among police to resist temptations to
abuse their authority-enables the direct measurement of the major propositions of an organizational/occupational
theory of police integrity. The research
reported in this Research in Brief demonstrates that police attitudes toward
the seriousness of misconduct, the discipline that should and would result,
and the willingness of officers to tolerate misconduct in silence can be measured. Moreover, the measurements
reported in this national sample are
relatively easy to collect. At the same
time, they demonstrate substantial

differences in the environments of
integrity in U.S. police agencies.
The ability to measure environments of
integrity in police agencies holds great
potential for academic studies of police and for practical police administration. For researchers, quantitative
cross-cultural, historical, and national
comparisons that were previously unthinkable have now become feasible.
Equally important, such measurements
have direct implications for practical
police administration because each of
the propositions of an organizational/
occupational theory of integrity implies a specific administrative response. If officers do not know whether
certain conduct violates agency policy
or what disciplinary threats the agency
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makes, administrators have a clear
responsibility to communicate this
information to officers. If officers do
not regard certain misconduct as sufficiently serious, if they regard discipline
as too severe or too lenient, or if they
are willing to tolerate the misconduct
of their police peers in silence, administrators have an obvious obligation to
find out why. A police administrator
can take specific actions to deal with
each of these problems.
The survey instrument used in this
study was designed to assess only one
aspect of police integrity. In all case
scenarios but one-the use of excessive force-the misconduct described
was motivated by personal gain. In
discussing environments of integrity,
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Exhibit 4. Agency 2 vs. Agency 23: Officers' perceptions of how most police would assess offense seriousness, discipline
that offense would receive, and whether most police would be willing to report offense
Agency 2 (A2) vs.
Agency 23 (A23)
How Most Police
Regard Seriousness
Case Scenario

Agency 2 (A2) vs.
Agency 23 (A23)
Discipline Would Receive

A2

A23

Difference

ttest

A2

A23

Difference

Case 1. Off-Duty Security
System Business

1.52

1.31

0.21

-1.61
NS*

1.70

1.33

0.37

Case 2. Free Meals,
Discounts on Beat

2.53

2.57

-0.04

0.41
NS*

2.77

2.51

0.26

4.90

4.45

0.45

3.07

2.88

0.19

5.73

4.93

0.80

4.45

3.91

0.54

3.24

3.52

-0.28

3.33

2.83

0.50

4.11

3.29

0.82

4.11

3.46

0.65

5.24

4.25

0.99

Case 3. Bribe From
Speeding Motorist

4.82

4.60

0.22

Case 4. Holiday Gifts
From Merchants

2.73

2.61

0.12

Case 5. Crime Scene
Theft of Watch

4.93

4.62

0.31

Case 6. Auto Repair
Shop 5% Kickback

4.31

3.75

0.56

Case 7. Supervisor:
Holiday for Tuneup

3.85

3.85

0

Case 8. Coverup of
Police DUI Accident

2.80

2.54

0.26

Case 9. Drinks to Ignore
Late Bar Closing

4.32

3.44

0.88

Case 10. Excessive Force
on Car Thief

4.01

3.22

0.79

Case 11. Theft From
Found Wallet

4.83

4.24

0.59

-4.25
p<.001
-1.10
NS*
-6.16
p<.001
-6.28
p<.001
0.04
NS*
-2.61
p<.05
-9.13
p<.001
-8.00
p<.001
-8.53
p<.001

ttest

-5.08
p<.001
-3.27
p<.05
-5.06
p<.001
-1.94
p<.01
-10.33
p<.001
-5.35
p<.001
2.78
p<.05
-4.92
p<.001
-8.92
p<.001
-6.86
p<.001
-10.79
p<.001

Agency 2 (A2) vs.
Agency 23 (A23)
Whether Most Police
Would Be Willing To Report
A2

A23

Difference

1.52

1.31

0.21

2.07

1.74

0.33

4.23

2.90

1.33

2.49

2.03

0.46

4.63

3.25

1.38

3.92

2.64

1.28

3.34

2.60

0.74

2.40

1.95

0.45

3.79

2.35

1.44

3.44

2.38

1.06

4.38

2.74

1.64

t test
-3.12
p<.05
-3.83
p<.001
-13.89
p<.001
-4.65
p<.001
-14.99
p<.001
-12.51
p<.001
-6.80
p<.001
-4.55
p<.001
-13.89
p<.001
-9.98
p<.001
-16.20
p<.001

* Not significant.

therefore, this survey makes no observation about abuses of discretion in arrests, order maintenance, discourtesy
to citizens, or other police misconduct
not usually motivated by temptations
of gain. A second generation of this
survey will explore those problems. 6

vide any evidence of abusive or dishonest practices-past, present, or future.
The survey findings do describe, in a
fairly precise way, the characteristics of
a police agency's culture that encourage its employees to resist or tolerate
certain types of misconduct.

A final note

Notes

This survey does not measure the extent of corruption in any police agency
or institution. Rather, it measures the
culture of police integrity-the normative inclination of police officers to resist the temptations to abuse the rights
and privileges of their office. The survey does not identify either corrupt or
honest police officers; nor does it pro-

l. Goldstein, Herman, Police Corruption: Perspective on Its Nature and Control, Washington,
DC: Police Foundation, 1975; and Goldstein,
H., Policing a Free Society, Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger, 1977. See also Sherman, Lawrence
W., Scandal and Reform, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1978; Marx, Gary, Surveillance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1991; Punch, Maurice, Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control, London: Tavistock, 1986;
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and Manning, Peter K., and Lawrence
Redlinger, "The Invitational Edges of Police
Corruption," in Thinking About Police, edited
by Carl Klockars and Stephen Mastrofski,
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993: 398-412.
2. Note that the notions of "greater than zero
(positive)" and "less than zero (negative)" are
merely shorthand for discipline perceived as
too lenient and too harsh, respectively. In other
words, because the data are ordinal, positive or
negative differences will not be used in any algebraic context. Rather, these differences will
be used solely as indicators to classify respondents into three groups-those who perceive
discipline to be fair, too lenient, or too harsh.
3. The frequency distribution of responses to
the question about officers' own willingness to
report a particular offense was analyzed. The
five-point scale of offered answers ranged from
!="definitely not" to 5="definitely yes." A cumulative frequency above 50 percent for l and

Research

2 was interpreted to indicate that police officers would not report the offense. A cumulative
frequency above 50 percent for 4 and 5, on the
other hand, was interpreted to indicate that the
police officers would report the offense.
4. See, for example, Haberfeld, Maria, Carl
Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak lvkovich, and Milan
Pagon, "Disciplinary Consequences of Police
Corruption in Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, and
the United States," Police Practice andResearch, An International Journal! (1) (2000):
41-72.

Carl B. Klockars, Ph.D., is professor
in the Department of Sociology and
Criminal Justice at the University of
Delaware. Sanja Kutnjak lvkovich,
Ph.D., is a doctoral student at
Harvard Law School. William E.
Harver, Ph.D., is assistant professor
of social science in the College of
Arts and Sciences at Widener University. Maria R. Haberfeld, Ph.D.,
is assistant professor in the Department of Law, Police Science, and
Criminal Justice Administration at
the John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, City University of New York.
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5. An alternative summary ranking system
could, of course, be based on the full range of
30-point rankings for each of the ll scenarios.
This type of system would create a scale that
could range from 330 (for an agency that scored
the lowest of the 30 agencies on all 6 questions
for allll scenarios) to 1,980 (for an agency
that scored the highest of all 30 agencies on all
6 questions for allll scenarios). Such a scoring system would, however, magnify small and
primarily meaningless differences in mean
scores, creating a false sense of precision. The
ranking system developed for and employed in

this research intentionally seeks to blunt any
false sense of precision by allowing agencies
to score, in a sense, only "high," "middle," or
"low" on any given question.

The study reported in this Research
in Brief was suppmted by the Office
of Community Oriented Policing
Services and NIJ through NIJ grant
number 95-IJ-CX-0058.

Findings and conclusions of the research
reported here are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the official position or
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Police administrators interested in
applying the approach used in this
study to measure the environment of
integrity in their own agencies are
advised to contact Professor Carl B.
Klockars, Principal Investigator,
Enhancing Police Integrity Project,
Criminal Justice, University of
Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

6. A summary of the status of progress with this
next generation of measures of police integrity
can be found on the videotape of the Research
in Progress seminar "Measuring Police Integrity," presented by Carl Klockars at the National Institute of Justice in January 1999.
Copies are available through the National
Criminal Justice Reference Service at 800851-3420. Please refer to NCJ 174459.
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